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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No.  18-3302 
________________ 
 
JAMES DURST, 
                           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-17-cv-02933) 
District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on November 15, 2019 
 
Before: JORDAN, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 14, 2020) 
 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 James Durst brought a claim for employment discrimination under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 against his former employer, the City of Philadelphia, alleging 
unlawful termination because of his race. The trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the City. We will affirm. 
 I.  
 James Durst, a Caucasian male, worked as a code inspector for the City’s Licenses 
and Inspections Department (“L & I Department”) from September 2011 until his 
termination on April 28, 2016. The City terminated Durst after it determined he violated 
Section 10-108 of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, which prohibits City of 
Philadelphia employees from engaging in fraud or dishonesty.  
Although code inspectors spend most of their work day “in the field” performing 
inspections, they are required to report in person to the office at the beginning of their 
shift. Inspectors are not allowed to begin their work day in the field without first 
obtaining supervisor approval. Despite his awareness of this rule and despite prior 
discipline for failing to follow it, Durst frequently began his work day in the field without 
permission. Hours after his shift began, he often emailed his supervisor, Ela Fernandez, 
informing her he started in the field that day. After Durst continued to ignore Fernandez’s 
warnings that he needed her permission before starting in the field, Fernandez began 
forwarding his emails to her supervisor, Bernice Johnson, who served as the field 
operations manager. Around the same time, Johnson began receiving numerous 
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complaints from property owners and occupants regarding Durst’s failure to show up for 
scheduled inspections and for wrongly reporting properties as code violations. After 
Johnson performed a field investigation into Durst’s work, the City determined Durst had 
falsified multiple inspection violations, route sheets, and other City documents.  
Following a disciplinary hearing, which Durst failed to appear for, the City sent 
Durst a notice of dismissal stating that he had violated Section 10-108 of the Philadelphia 
Home Rule Charter by failing to obtain permission before starting work in the field, 
traveling outside his authorized district, falsely claiming he never received 
reimbursement for mileage or training, and falsifying City documents. Durst appealed his 
termination to the Civil Service Commission, but failed to appear for his hearing. The 
Commission determined there was just cause for Durst’s termination because the 
evidence showed he consistently falsely reported the conditions of the properties he 
allegedly inspected. Durst did not appeal the Commission’s ruling.  
 Durst filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on 
August 10, 2016, alleging unlawful termination on account of his race. He asserts the L & 
I Department’s non-Caucasian management—specifically his supervisor, Ela Fernandez, 
and the field operations manager, Bernice Johnson—treated him less favorably than his 
fellow inspectors. He received a notice of right to bring suit and commenced this action 
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The City filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.  
 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court found 
that Durst could not prove a prima facie case for racial discrimination. Durst failed to 
proffer any relevant comparators who were treated more favorably and merely asserted 
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his own subjective belief of discriminatory conduct, and even if Durst had set forth a 
prima facie case, the City established legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for his 
termination that Durst was unable to rebut as pretextual. This appeal followed.1 
II. 
 As we will explain, Durst failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. 
We concur with the trial court’s assessment that the City is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. We evaluate Durst’s discrimination claim under the familiar three-part 
analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under 
this framework, Durst must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  The 
burden then shifts to the City to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Durst’s 
termination. Durst must then be given an opportunity to show the City’s stated reasons 
were a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 802–03; Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 
157–58 (3d Cir. 1999).  
 To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, Durst must show (1) he is a 
member of a protected class, (2) he is qualified for his position, (3) he suffered an adverse 
                                              
1 The trial court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same 
standard the trial court applied in determining whether summary judgment was 
appropriate. Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015). Summary 
judgment is proper when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the 
moving party is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual 
dispute is “genuine” if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find for the 
nonmoving party, and “material” if its adjudication bears on an essential element of the 
plaintiff’s claim. Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 337 (3d Cir. 2002). When ruling on 
a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 
524, 535 (3d Cir. 2007).   
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employment action, and (4) the adverse employment action gave rise to an inference of 
unlawful discrimination.2 Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410–11 (3d Cir. 
1999). Durst presented no evidence supporting an inference that the City discriminated 
against him because of his race.  
 Durst attempts to show discriminatory intent through comparator evidence—he 
asserts four non-Caucasian inspectors engaged in similar misconduct, but the City never 
investigated or disciplined them. The trial court correctly determined the comparators 
Durst offered could not be used for the purpose of demonstrating discrimination because 
they were not similarly situated. Although “similarly situated” does not mean identically 
situated, the comparator must be similar in all relevant respects. Johnson v. Kroger Co., 
319 F.3d 858, 867 (6th Cir. 2003). Relevant factors include whether the comparators had 
the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar 
conduct. Id. Durst provides no relevant comparator evidence giving rise to an inference 
of discriminatory intent.  
Durst alleges two fellow inspectors began work in the field without permission 
and were never investigated. But the record reveals that one of these inspectors never 
started in the field and the other inspector always obtained permission before starting in 
the field. Durst further argues another inspector falsified City documents and the City 
                                              
2 Because Durst is Caucasian, his claim is referred to as a “reverse discrimination” claim, 
which this Circuit recognizes. See Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 158. But unlike other Circuits, 
this Circuit does not require the plaintiff to show “background circumstances” 
demonstrating the defendant is an unusual employer who discriminates against the 
majority. Id. at 160.  
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never investigated her, but he presents no evidence showing falsification. She also had a 
different supervisor. Lastly, Durst alleges the City failed to discipline an inspector who is 
a registered sex offender and inspected homes with children present. As the trial court 
properly pointed out, this inspector’s alleged misconduct is not similar to Durst’s and 
Durst merely provides his own unsubstantiated belief of misconduct. Durst does not 
provide relevant evidence permitting an inference of discriminatory intent and fails to 
make a prima facie case of race discrimination.  
 Even if Durst could assert a prima facie case of race discrimination, the City 
asserted numerous legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for terminating him. The City 
found Durst in violation of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter for failing to obtain 
supervisor permission before starting work in the field and falsifying his inspections. 
Durst’s supervisor stated she had never received such a large number of complaints about 
a single inspector. The City’s Integrity Officer believed Durst was a “danger to the 
public” because he failed to conduct actual inspections. J.A. 556a. Moreover, the Civil 
Service Commission concluded there was sufficient evidence to show he consistently 
falsely reported property conditions. Accordingly, the City points to legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for terminating Durst.  
 Because the City carried its burden, Durst can only survive summary judgment if 
he can prove the City’s articulated reasons were a pretext for racial discrimination. Durst 
fails to meet this burden.  
 Durst attempts to prove pretext by asserting the “cat’s paw” theory, which 
provides that unlawful discrimination occurs when a nonbiased decision-maker is 
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influenced by a biased managerial employee. Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 
323, 330 (3d Cir. 2015). Durst argues the City’s decision to terminate him was tainted by 
Fernandez and Johnson’s racial animus towards him. Durst’s argument lacks evidentiary 
support. Nothing in the record shows or implies Fernandez or Johnson exhibited racial 
animus towards Durst.  
 Durst argues Fernandez showed racial animus towards him because she ignored 
his emails and allowed Christina Phillips, a non-Caucasian inspector, to start work in the 
field without permission. But the record established that Phillips always asked for 
permission before starting in the field and Fernandez sometimes denied her requests. 
Moreover, because Durst continued to start his day in the field without permission, 
despite Fernandez’s warnings, Fernandez reported up the chain-of-command by 
forwarding his emails to Johnson, her supervisor. The record is devoid of any evidence 
showing Fernandez exhibited racial animus towards Durst.  
 Durst also asserts Johnson’s choice to not interview him during her investigation 
of his work was rooted in racial animus, relying on Mastro v. Potomac Electric Power 
Co., 447 F.3d 843 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Durst’s reliance on Mastro is unpersuasive because 
his case involves a largely different set of facts. In Mastro, an African-American 
supervisor terminated the Caucasian plaintiff for lying about his subordinate who did not 
show up to work because he was incarcerated. The case turned on when the plaintiff 
learned about the subordinate’s incarceration. Id. at 847–48. His termination centered 
mainly on an unsubstantiated statement made by a biased fellow employee about the 
plaintiff. Id. at 855–56. The court determined the investigation was faulty because the 
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supervisor had relied on an unconfirmed statement and never interviewed the plaintiff for 
his side of the story. Id.  
Unlike the investigation in Mastro, the City thoroughly investigated Durst’s 
misconduct after it received several outside complaints. Moreover, as the trial court 
pointed out, Durst’s own emails and Johnson’s investigation into his inspections both 
document and validate his misconduct.  
Durst also tries to establish pretext by arguing he did not engage in misconduct. 
His argument is without merit. Aside from Durst’s subjective opinion that he did not 
falsely report the conditions of the properties he allegedly inspected, the record presents 
no facts that would suggest the City’s investigation into his work and subsequent findings 
were rooted in racial animus. The City is entitled to summary judgment.   
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.    
